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A B S T R A C T
In many countries large parts of the population do not have access to health insurance. Peru has made an
effort to change this in the early 2000s. The institutional setup gives rise to the rare opportunity to study the
effects of health insurance coverage exploiting a sharp regression discontinuity design. We find large effects
on utilization that are most pronounced for the provision of curative care. Individuals seeing a doctor leads to
increased awareness about health problems and generates a potentially desirable form of supplier-induced
demand: they decide to pay themselves for services that are in short supply.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In developing countries, a large number of individuals is not cov-
ered by health insurance (Banerjee et al., 2004; Banerjee and Duflo,
2007). The reasons for this are manifold. On the one hand, individuals
are often used to relying on informal forms of risk-sharing instead
 We are grateful to Eric Bonsang, Dimitris Christelis, Pilar García Gómez, seminar
participants at Vanderbilt University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tilburg Univer-
sity and Diego Portales University, as well as participants of the First Annual Congress
of the Peruvian Economic Association, the IX Annual Meeting of the Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean Economic Association and the 2015 Netspar International Pension
Workshop for helpful comments. Maria Eugenia Guerrero, Nicolas Dominguez and
Ana Claudia Palacios provided excellent research assistance. We would also like to
thank Juan Pichihua from the Peruvian Ministry of Economics and functionaries of SIS
and MINSA for providing useful information and for their comments and suggestions.
Finally, we would like to thank the co-editor, Craig Garthwaite, and three anonymous
referees for their insightful comments and suggestions.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: n.bernall@up.edu.pe (N. Bernal), miguel.carpio@udep.pe
(M.A. Carpio), T.J.Klein@uvt.nl (T.J. Klein).
1 The first author is grateful for financial support from Netspar and the Sociale
Verzekeringsbank.
of being covered by formal health insurance and therefore do not
demand insurance.2 On the other hand, it has in the past not been
seen as the role of the government to provide health insurance.
Moreover, the World Health Organization and the World Bank stress
that, even when there is public health insurance, it often does not
reach large parts of the population and especially not the poorest
families because it is only provided to the minority of employees in
the formal sector (WHO, 2010; Hsiao and Shaw, 2007). For instance,
until the late 1990s, only 23% of the individuals in Peru had health
insurance (CEPLAN, 2011).
This may be a cause of concern, because health insurance does not
only protect individuals against catastrophically high health expen-
ditures (Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003). It also encourages them to see
a doctor instead of simply buying medication, and thereby promotes
appropriate treatment of illnesses that is often argued to be absent
2 See for instance Fafchamps (1999), Jowett (2003), Chankova et al. (2008), Giné et
al. (2008) and Dercon et al. (2008).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.008
0047-2727/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
N. Bernal et al. / Journal of Public Economics 154 (2017) 122–136 123
(Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; International
Labour Office et al., 2006).
In reaction, many low and middle income countries have recently
introduced Social Health Insurance (SHI) targeted to the poor, with
the goal to improve their health and also to provide them with pro-
tection against the financial consequences of health shocks. Coverage
by SHI may or may not be free and typically means that individuals
receive medical attention from a service provider. The costs are usu-
ally paid out of a designated government budget that is completely
or partially funded by taxes.
However, to date, it is not well understood through which chan-
nels health insurance coverage contributes to the well-being of
individuals and how this relates to the incentives provided to health
care providers and patients and, more generally, to the institutional
environment.3 Important questions in this context are to what extent
it is possible to encourage individuals to seek medical attention
rather than simply buying medication in a pharmacy, how they can
be motivated to invest into preventive care, and what the effects
of medical attention are on care consumption and out-of-pocket
spending.4
Answering those questions is challenging for at least two reasons.
First, we lack detailed data on health care utilization and out-of-
pocket expenditures, and second, it is challenging to control for
selection into insurance. The second problem means that a regres-
sion of utilization or expenditure measures on insurance coverage
will yield biased results and will not estimate the causal effects of
health insurance. In this paper, we make progress in both directions.
We use unusually rich data from the National Household Survey
of Peru (“Encuesta Nacional de Hogares”, ENAHO) to evaluate the
impact of access to the Peruvian SHI called “Seguro Integral de Salud”
(SIS) for individuals outside the formal labor market on a variety
of measures for health care utilization and out-of-pocket expen-
ditures. We account for selection by exploiting a sharp regression
discontinuity design.
The Peruvian case is interesting because SIS resembles Western
public health insurance systems and private insurance products in
that it covers health care expenditures related to both curative use
and preventive care, but does not provide extra incentives to invest
in preventive care. Coverage is free for eligible individuals, and those
who are not covered by SIS typically lack insurance coverage.5 SIS
was created in 2001 and subsequently reformed. Prima facie, these
reforms have been successful, as coverage by SIS is comprehensive
and the fraction of the population making use of it has increased
from 20% in 2006 to 45% of the total population in 2011, reaching
a relatively high rate among the SHI programs in low and middle
income countries (Acharya et al., 2013). Yet, even though aggregate
data suggest that some health outcomes improved since the program
has been implemented—between 2000 and 2010 total maternal mor-
tality rates decreased from 185 to 93 per 100,000 children born and
child mortality rates decreased from 33 to 17 per 1000 children
born6—to date there is little evidence on the effects of insurance
3 See for instance Abel-Smith (1992), International Labour Office et al. (2006), Pauly
et al. (2006), and Acharya et al. (2013). Also for developed countries, our understand-
ing in that respect has increased substantially over the last decades, but is still far from
being complete.
4 We interchangeably use the terms spending and expenditures in combination
with out-of-pocket, health care, or health.
5 The latter may, however, seek medical attention on a pay-as-you-go basis in
the same national hospitals or healthcare centers, or buy medication without a
prescription.
6 National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI)-National series, http://series.
inei.gob.pe:8080/sirtod-series/. Dow and Schmeer (2003) perform an analysis of the
effect of health insurance in Costa Rica on infant and child mortality. They use aggre-
gate level data at the county level and control for fixed effects. As in Peru, increases in
insurance coverage over time went along with decreases in infant and child mortality.
Gruber et al. (2014) find evidence for similar effects in Thailand.
coverage that is based on micro level data. A notable exception is
the paper by Neelsen and O’Donnell (2017) who study the effects of
introducing SIS by means of a differences-in-differences analysis.7
In this paper, we instead study the effects of an upgraded version
of the program and make use of the opportunity to control for selec-
tion by exploiting the institutional setup in Peru that gives rise to a
sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD). It originates in a reform
that was agreed upon in 2009. Since the end of 2010, an individual
who is not formally employed is eligible for free public health insur-
ance if a welfare index called Household Targeting Index (“Índice de
Focalización de Hogares”, IFH) that is calculated by Peruvian author-
ities from a number of variables is below a specific threshold. We
have access to this information and use it to re-calculate the com-
posite index of economic welfare. Variation in this index around the
threshold provides the natural experiment that we exploit.
Two aspects of the institutional background in combination with
our research design are particularly appealing. First, all individu-
als who are eligible for the program can be considered covered by
it. The reason for this is that enrollment is easy and quick, as it
can take place at the facility at which individuals seek treatment. It
does not involve any fees, and as individuals can usually receive free
treatment within a few days, often on the next day. Second, for our
population of interest, crossing the eligibility threshold implies cov-
erage. This means that we will estimate the local average treatment
effects of insurance coverage for those individuals whose welfare
index has a value close to the eligibility threshold. The evidence we
provide is policy-relevant, as it addresses the question what would
happen to individuals who are just not covered if eligibility would be
expanded by increasing the threshold.
Making use of the rich data from the ENAHO of Peru and the
discontinuity generated by the institutional rules, we find large
effects on several measures of curative care use in combination with
increases in out-of-pocket spending. Individuals are more likely to
receive medicines, it is more likely that a medical analysis is per-
formed, they are more likely to visit a hospital, and it is more likely
that they receive surgery.
We shed light on the underlying mechanisms by characteriz-
ing who pays for each of these forms of care. We show that the
increased access to doctors who perform medical analysis and pre-
scribe medicines is usually fully financed by SIS. At the same time,
we find that medicines, hospital visits and/or surgeries are financed
by households themselves.
In line with this, insurance coverage leads to increases in out-
of-pocket spending for medicines, hospital visits and/or surgery that
are likely driven by limitations faced by the health care suppliers.
Using an estimator of quantile treatment effects, we find that the
effects on spending are particularly pronounced in the top end of the
distribution.
7 They estimate the effects of introducing a previous benefit plan called “Listado
Priorizado de Intervenciones Sanitarias” (LPIS). In this paper, we study the effects of
a comprehensive package of health care benefits, composed of a basic plan of health
benefits called “Plan Esencial de Aseguramiento en Salud” (PEAS) and two highly
generous supplementary plans. There are other studies relating enrollment to health
care utilization and outcomes. For instance, Parodi (2005) finds that SIS enrollment
increases the probability that poor pregnant women give birth in a formal institu-
tion. However, he does not control for selection into insurance. Bitrán and Asociados
(2009) find that SIS increases utilization for both preventive and curative services
(with biggest impacts on treatments for diarrhea and acute respiratory infections for
children) and that SIS reduces the likelihood that insured individuals incur in out-
of-pocket health expenditures. The authors control for selection into insurance but
they do not use the means test used by SIS at the period of analysis. Instead, they use
consumption per capita to evaluate eligibility. There are also studies that are more
policy-oriented. For example, Arróspide et al. (2009) discuss the design and effective-
ness of the SIS’s institutional budget and provide policy recommendations. Francke
(2013) analyzes whether the implementation of the SIS program has played a role in
extending health coverage in Peru.
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We interpret these findings in more detail by looking at them
through the lens of a simple conceptual framework that we present
in Section 3 below. The main contribution of our paper is that we
provide evidence in favor of two arguments that are less common in
economics.8 First, insurance coverage leads to increased awareness
about health problems, because it increases the likelihood that indi-
viduals see a doctor; and second, this even generates a willingness
to pay for services that are not covered or not available, which in the
context of Peru is a potentially desirable form of supplier-induced
demand.
There is a huge literature on the effects of health insurance cov-
erage in the developed world. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to summarize this literature. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) provide
an excellent survey. One of the most important general findings is
that more generous insurance coverage leads to increases in health
care utilization. This has been convincingly documented in the con-
text of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse, 1974,
1993; Aron-Dine et al., 2013) and more recently in the context of the
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2012).
In comparison, the literature on the effects of SHI in low and mid-
dle income countries is scarce, but growing.9 The evidence points
towards large effects on utilization. At the same time, the picture is
still blurred when it comes to out-of-pocket spending. In part, this is
because earlier contributions have not focused on linking evidence
on the effects on spending by type of care to the institutional envi-
ronment. Our data allow us to make progress in this direction and
thereby shed light on the underlying pathways.
For Peru, Neelsen and O’Donnell (2017) find positive effects of an
earlier form of SIS on receipt of ambulatory care and medication, but
no impact on inpatient care and average out-of-pocket expenditures.
Thornton et al. (2010) find that initial take-up of subsidized, but
for-pay insurance “Seguro Facultativo de Salud” among informally
employed individuals in Nicaragua was as low as 20%. Moreover,
after the subsidy expired most individuals who previously signed up
cancelled their insurance. The results for the few who did sign up
and kept their insurance suggest that insurance could have a posi-
tive effect in the sense that average health care expenditures, which
are generally seen as too low, increased. This could, however, also
be the case because those who bought insurance and kept it consti-
tute a negative selection of risks for whom the effect of insurance is
particularly high.
Next to this, there are a number of studies on Mexico, includ-
ing Barros (2008), King et al. (2009), Sosa-Rubi et al. (2009), and
Galárraga et al. (2010). All of them investigate the effects of the
“Seguro Popular” program, whose aim is—as the SIS’s in Peru—to
improve access to health insurance for the poor. Unlike in the Peru-
vian, but like in the Nicaraguan program, coverage in the Mexican
program is not for free. The findings in all four papers consistently
8 An exception is Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) who focus on the effects of health
insurance on financial risk in China and find that health insurance coverage increases
the risk of incurring high and catastrophic spending, respectively. They argue that this
is because insurance encourages individuals to seek care and this ultimately leads to
higher expenditures that they then cover themselves.
9 The selection of papers we discuss here is necessarily incomplete, but we believe
it is to some extent representative. Acharya et al. (2013) systematically examine 64
papers on the effects of health insurance and present a review on the 19 papers
that correct for selection into insurance. The review concludes that there is little evi-
dence on the impact of insurance on health status, some evidence on utilization, weak
evidence on out-of-pocket health expenditures, and unclear effects for the poorest.
However, arguably, given the large variation in incentives provided by the respective
institutions, it is not surprising that there is heterogeneity in the effect across coun-
tries. Giedion et al. (2013) also provide a comprehensive review classifying papers
according to findings and research design. They also conclude that specific features of
the design have a large impact on the likelihood that specific goals, such as increas-
ing access or improving health, are reached. See also Abel-Smith (1992), International
Labour Office et al. (2006), Pauly et al. (2006) and Dercon et al. (2008), and the
references therein, for a review of the more policy-oriented literature.
suggest that the demand for medical care has shifted to providers
that are part of the system, and in line with this, individual health
care expenditures have been reduced, including catastrophic health
expenditures. In that sense, the program was successful in being a
transfer program, but less so in encouraging individuals to seek care
when ill. The findings do not suggest that utilization has increased
for types of care other than obstetric utilization.
Turning to China, Lu (2014) shows supplier-induced demand
to be potentially important. She finds that when doctors expect
to obtain a proportion of patients’ drug expenditures, then they
write more expensive prescriptions to insured patients. Wagstaff
et al. (2009) find that the launch of a heavily subsidized voluntary
health insurance program in the rural parts of the country led to
increased outpatient and inpatient utilization, but has not reduced
out-of-pocket expenditures.
In contrast, Wagstaff (2010) finds for Vietnam that insurance cov-
erage led to a reduction of out-of-pocket spending and no impact on
utilization.
The design of the program in Georgia is very similar to the one in
Peru. However, and in contrast to our findings, Bauhoff et al. (2011)
find no effect of insurance coverage on utilization. They argue that
the reason for this is that individuals were not aware of being cov-
ered, or that there were administrative problems that caused them
to indeed not be covered, that they did not make use of the services
because the program did not cover drugs, and because the perceived
quality of the services was low. Therefore, it is not surprising that
their findings are different from ours for Peru.
Next, turning to Colombia, and comparing the results to the ones
in this paper for Peru, it becomes clear that the effects of insurance
coverage depend on the design of the system. In Colombia, private
insurers mainly receive a capitation fee and therefore have incen-
tives to increase preventive services on the one hand and to limit
total medical expenditures on the other. And indeed, Miller et al.
(2013) mainly find effects on preventive care. In Peru, SIS covers both
preventive and curative services and doctors are reimbursed on the
basis of the treatments they provide. Hence, participating hospitals
and health care facilities do not have an incentive to discourage cura-
tive treatments or medical procedures in favor of preventive services.
This explains why in Peru most of the effects are on curative use.
Finally, two recent papers, Gruber et al. (2014) and Limwat-
tananon et al. (2015), investigate the effect of a large-scale increase
in health insurance coverage for the poor in Thailand. They find that
the program had positive effects on health care utilization, negative
effects on out-of-pocket expenditures, and negative effects on child
mortality rates. These findings are similar to ours for Peru, except
that we find positive effects on health expenditures at the top end
of the distribution. Our explanation for this is that individuals, once
covered, became aware of additional health care needs and payed for
some of them out-of-pocket.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional back-
ground and provides details on the SIS program. We present a
conceptual framework—an informal sketch of a model of demand
for health insurance and health care utilization—in Section 3. In
Section 4 we provide information on our data and in Section 5
we describe the econometric approach. Results are presented in
Section 6. A number of robustness checks are conducted in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes. Additional results are presented in an Online
Appendix.
2. Institutional background
2.1. Seguro Integral de Salud
The public health insurance program “Seguro Integral de Salud”
(SIS), whose effect we study in this paper, was introduced in 2001.
Its overarching goal is to improve access to health care services for
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individuals who lack health insurance, giving priority to vulnerable
groups of the population who live in extreme poverty and are not
formally employed (Arróspide et al., 2009).
The creation of SIS and subsequent reforms led to a substan-
tial increase of health insurance coverage over time. Bitrán and
Asociados (2009) and Francke (2013) provide interesting descriptive
analyses of this increase and its relevance within the Peruvian health
system in general. Between 2006 and 2011 the fraction of the pop-
ulation making use of services provided by SIS increased from 20 to
45%, which means that by then SIS was the main health insurance
provider in Peru.10
2.2. Eligibility and benefit package
The aim of the government was to target poor groups in the
population. For this, ideally, eligibility should be based on accu-
rate information on income at the level of the individual or family.
However, such information is typically not available in developing
countries because a large part of the population works outside the
formal sector and therefore does not pay income taxes and social
security contributions. Eligibility for SIS is therefore based on the
so-called Household Targeting System (“Sistema de Focalización de
Hogares”, SISFOH). A unified household registry is maintained and
is used to calculate targeting indicators at the level of the family.11
Data are collected by government officials on a continuous basis
and using a standardized form. There are questions on, among other
things, housing characteristics, asset possessions, human capital
endowments and other factors.
The IFH index is the main eligibility criterion for the sample of
non-formally employed individuals we consider in this paper. It is
a linear combination of the variables in the household registry that
takes on lower values for households that are poorer. Eligibility for SIS
is based on SISFOH in the capital Lima from 2011 on, and in the rest of
the country from 2012 on. Online Appendix F explains in detail how
the IFH is constructed, including the complete list of variables and
their weights. Individuals are eligible if it is below a regional-specific
threshold.12 Importantly, whereas potential beneficiaries intuit the
importance of their answers to the questions of the government offi-
cial, they do not know how exactly the IFH index is calculated and
what their cutoff value for eligibility is. SISFOH does not inform house-
holds about the value of their index and only provides the result of
the eligibility evaluation. If eligible, individuals have the possibility
to enroll into SIS at a number of places, including the Ministry of
Health (“Ministerio de Salud”, MINSA) facilities. They are covered as
soon as eligibility is confirmed, which is usually a matter of days,
often only one. Then, they receive the health services that are offered
at MINSA facilities and that are part of the benefit package. In this
10 This increase was higher than the one in other countries, such as Colombia. One of
the reasons for this could be that the price for insurance was truly zero. Although there
is no economic reason why there should be a substantial difference between a zero
price and a small positive price, behavioral aspects that lead to individuals perceiving
a big difference between the two may play an important role (Shampanier et al., 2007).
11 See SISFOH (2010) and Law 29626, “Decreto de Urgencia 048-2010” and “Resolu-
ción Jefatural 063-2011/SIS” for specific regulations that mandate to use SISFOH’s rules
for eligibility to SIS.
12 At the same time, it is required that water and electricity expenditures are both
below some specific thresholds. We control for this in our analysis, as we explain in
Section 5. For Lima, the thresholds are 55 for the IFH, 20 Soles for water expenditures,
and 25 Soles for electricity expenditures. This corresponds to 7.3 and 9.1 U.S.~dollars,
respectively. According to the Central Bank of Peru, the average informal exchange
rate (Nuevos Soles per U.S. Dollar) in 2011 was 2.755. As a reference, the inter-
banking rate was 2.754. Table A.10 in Online Appendix F provides the complete set
of IFH thresholds by geographic areas. Fig. A.8 shows the relationship between water
and electricity expenditures and the IFH index. The Online Appendix also contains
further details on the eligibility rules.
sense, eligibility also means coverage.13 In urban areas, the eligibil-
ity evaluation is valid for a period of 3 years (4 years in rural ones).
This means in practice that re-enrollment after a year is automatic
provided that individuals are not covered by another health insur-
ance, individuals do not ask to be un-enrolled in the meantime, an
individual changes address, and provided that there is no evidence
for fraud. It is not related to the IFH index and in practice, exclusion
of individuals after a period of enrollment is very uncommon.
SIS offers a comprehensive package of health care benefits, com-
posed of a basic plan of health benefits called PEAS and two sup-
plementary plans. The PEAS plan is based on a wide-ranging list of
needs that any public and private insurance plan (including SIS) must
address, grouped in the following six categories: healthy population
(preventive care), obstetric and gynecological care, as well as care
related to pediatric conditions, neoplasm conditions, transmittable
conditions and non-transmittable conditions.14 There is an extensive
list of benefits related to each listed need. The plan covers ambula-
tory patient services, hospitalization and emergency care. Table A.1
in Online Appendix B shows that PEAS covers 994 out of the 12,421
possible needs listed in International Statistical Classification of Dis-
eases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), that is, up to 8.0% of all
possible needs.15 It is estimated that PEAS covers 65% of the total dis-
ease burden (Francke, 2013). Importantly, for individuals covered by
SIS, benefits included in PEAS cannot be subject to exclusions, wait-
ing times or latent periods.16 Moreover, there are no co-payments,
coinsurance, deductibles, or similar fees.17
PEAS includes theoretical limits to the number of times an indi-
vidual can receive each listed benefit. However, these limits are
effectively annulled by the two SIS supplementary plans. Individ-
uals enrolled to SIS are automatically covered by these plans, that
is, they do not need to sign up to them nor to fulfill new require-
ments. The Regular Supplementary Plan18 adds 1640 more needs to
the PEAS list, that is, an additional 13.2% of needs included in ICD-
10 (see Table A.1). This plan includes a monetary limit by event close
to US$ 1875. 19 Next to this, the Extraordinary Coverage Supplemen-
tary Plan20 is particularly generous as it allows SIS to go beyond the
list of needs established by the previous two plans in a discretionary
way, and also beyond the established limits. This supplementary plan
states a new extremely generous monetary limit: costs for an indi-
vidual must not exceed 2.5% of the annual SIS budget. There is an
application procedure to access benefits using standardized forms.
In sum, SIS covers more than 2634 needs (21.2% of needs included
in ICD-10) and, through supplementary plans, the stated limits are
offset so that SIS offers a very generous package of health care
benefits.21
13 It could be that some individuals are not aware of being eligible and therefore
think of themselves as not being covered by health insurance. If this is the case, then
we will estimate lower bounds of the effect sizes, as explain in Section 7.7 below.
14 See “Decreto Supremo 016-2009/SA” for detail information on this “Plan Esencial
de Aseguramiento en Salud”, PEAS.
15 The table also shows how these covered needs distributes according to the ICD-10
classification.
16 See articles 89 and 90 of “Reglamento de la Ley 29344. Ley Marco de Asegu-
ramiento Universal en Salud”, approved by “Decreto Supremo 008-2010-SA” .
17 See article 80 of “Reglamento de la Ley 29344. Ley Marco de Aseguramiento
Universal en Salud”, approved by “Decreto Supremo 008-2010-SA” .
18 See “Resolución Jefatural 133-2010/SIS” for detail information on this Regular
Supplementary Plan.
19 The precise limit is 1.5 times the Peruvian Tax Unit (PTU), a reference value used
in tax rules to calculate tax bases, deductions and tax limits. As a reference, the PTU is
almost US$1250 in 2017.
20 See “Resolución Jefatural 134-2010/SIS” for detailed information on this Extraor-
dinary Coverage Supplementary Plan.
21 The only explicit exclusions are three: surgery not oriented towards improve-
ment of health status, medical attentions with other financing source, and medical
attentions outside the Peruvian territory.
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2.3. Supply side
The Ministry of Health (MINSA) runs a network of health care
centers and hospitals that provides services to individuals covered
by SIS. They also serve individuals who are not covered by SIS, who
pay for this themselves. Patients usually first visit a health care cen-
ter and are referred to a hospital when the health care center cannot
provide a proper diagnosis or treatment. Health care centers do how-
ever not act as gatekeepers. That is, individuals can also directly visit
a hospital.
Each MINSA facility is reimbursed by SIS on the basis of the
treatments it provides. Reimbursement rates are based on estimates
of the variable costs plus a markup.22 There is no capitation fee
and there are no extra incentives to either limit curative care use
or encourage investments in preventive care, as it is the case in
Colombia, for example.
Importantly for our findings, some MINSA facilities suffered from
a number of substantial supply limitations.23 They originate in a cut
that SIS experienced in its budget, which in turn resulted in a failure
to transfer resources for reimbursement to MINSA facilities during
the entire year of 2011.
The effects of those supply limitations are not systematically doc-
umented, but there is evidence that in response, especially hospitals
charged money for medicines and treatments to insured patients.24
To counteract this, “SIS agents” were put in place, who are supposed
to ensure that hospitals stop this practice in later years.25
Besides, there has been a shortage of dentists and ophthalmolo-
gists. The rate of odontologists per ten thousand inhabitants is one of
the lowest among all medical professionals (Giovanella et al., 2012)
and it is even lower when they work as providers for SIS (Defensoría
del Pueblo, 2013). In addition to that, at that time, only a small num-
ber of ophthalmologists provides services to SIS participants, which
in turn limits the use of ophthalmological care. Only recently, after
our study period, the National Ophthalmological Institute, the largest
provider in Peru, joined the list of SIS providers.
In sum, even though SIS offers a comprehensive package of health
care benefits, supply limitations and institutional problems related
22 In addition, direct governmental budget transfers to MINSA are supposed to
cover fixed costs.
23 Defensoría del Pueblo (2013) reports that in 2012, 20% of the hospitals lack at least
one piece of equipment required for inpatient surgery and 15% report to face problems
with at least one other input needed for performing surgery.
24 The survey underlying our data, described in Section 4 below, contains one ques-
tion that is asked to individuals who report having a health incident and seek medical
attention at MINSA facilities or other places. Individuals are asked whether they found
the prescribed drugs at the facility. 43.6% answer with no, suggesting that they may
have bought them themselves in a pharmacy. We have also conducted a small infor-
mal survey in two health care facilities, in October and December 2014. We asked 19
individuals about their experiences. Their answers revealed that the facilities did not
have enough drugs in 2011, so that the individuals bought them themselves at pri-
vate pharmacies. They also confirmed that the lack of equipment meant that certain
treatments could not be undertaken, which resulted in patients paying themselves for
treatment that was received elsewhere. For instance, one person needed to receive
prostate surgery and said that he will probably get it elsewhere instead of waiting
until the next year.
25 See the Annual Report to Parliament made by the “Defensoría del Pueblo” (Defen-
soría del Pueblo, 2011) for evidence for the year 2011 and “Resolución Jefatural 091-
2013/SIS” for evidence for the year 2012 and the creation of “SIS agents”. The agents
were located at hospitals to supervise the entire process of health care provision to SIS
affiliates, especially whether procedures were effectively free and individuals received
all prescribed medicines. In the beginning, SIS hired 22 agents to supervise hospitals
of Lima and Callao. In the rest of the country, more agents were hired over time. Other
tasks of the agents were to ease the coordination between hospitals and SIS when
there were problems and to provide information to and receive complaints from indi-
viduals covered by SIS. One may wonder whether the behavior of hospitals was illegal.
Regulation was not clear in this respect. Only at the end of 2011, it was established
that SIS and providers have joint legal responsibility for effectively providing cover-
age to SIS affiliates. See “Resolución de Superintendencia 160-2011-SUNASA/CD” for
further details.
to the transfer of resources from SIS to MINSA facilities made some
medicines and treatments not fully available and free for the insured.
It is an empirical question how this affects care consumption and
out-of-pocket expenditures. We turn to this question in our analysis
below.
3. Conceptual framework
It is instructive to interpret our empirical results through the lens
of a conceptual framework. We provide a formal model complement-
ing this framework in Online Appendix A. The primary purpose of
this framework is to discuss the implications the institutional setup
has on health care demand, with a focus on individuals not being
aware of some of their health care needs when they are not covered
by health insurance.
Without them seeing a doctor individuals are aware of some
health care needs, but not all. Sen (2002) distinguishes in this con-
text between “internal” and “external” views of health and stresses
that “the patient’s internal assessment may be seriously limited by
his or her social experience”, such as seeing a doctor or not.26
Importantly, and in contrast to what is common in developed
countries, in Peru the individual can buy all drugs at the pharmacy.
That is, there are no prescription drugs. Therefore, the baseline case
is that she buys drugs at the pharmacy to treat the health care needs
she is aware of and pays for this herself. This has been common prac-
tice for a long time and may of course ultimately have adverse effects
on health. However, evidence on this is scarce (Laing et al., 2001).
Suppose now that the individual considers seeking professional
care at some cost. Because of the cost, she will only do so if the health
care needs she is aware of are important enough to her. She will be
more inclined to do so when insured, because she will expect that
at least some treatments will be covered by the insurance once she
visits a doctor.
Suppose she decides to visit the doctor and the treatment is
indeed covered by insurance. Then it could be that because of this
she will consume more care than she would if she would have to
pay for it herself, which could be due to the fact that individuals are
liquidity-constrained and health insurance helps them pay for health
care, or because of moral hazard.27
The value associated to this generates an additional incentive to
see a doctor in the first place.
Conversely, one reason not to visit a health care center is the per-
ception that—even though health insurance gives individuals access
to doctors—this is not valuable because advice obtained from them
is often of low quality, and therefore making use of insurance cover-
age is not worth its (opportunity) cost, including the time it takes to
register.28
26 See also the discussion of various biases in self-assessed health measures in
Murray and Chen (1992).
27 This increase in the demand for medical care is commonly termed ex post moral
hazard. In contrast, a reduction of preventive effort or care that is due to them being
covered by health insurance is termed ex ante moral hazard. If higher risk types, in
the absence of moral hazard, buy insurance, then one speaks of adverse selection, fol-
lowing Akerlof (1970). See for instance Zweifel and Manning (2000). The empirical
literature on moral hazard and adverse selection is still scarce, but growing. Chiappori
(2000) provides a broad review of the early literature. Chiappori and Salanié (2000),
Abbring et al. (2003a), and Abbring et al. (2003b) investigate moral hazard in the mar-
ket for car insurance. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Bajari et al. (2006), Fang et al.
(2006), Aron-Dine et al. (2015) and Einav et al. (2013) study adverse selection and
moral hazard in the context of health insurance in developed countries. Einav et al.
(2013) study the interrelation between adverse selection and moral hazard and term
it “selection on moral hazard”.
28 Das et al. (2008) provide evidence pointing towards such low quality advice, at
least in other low-income countries. Non-enrollment into free (net of the opportunity
cost of time) health insurance is a well-documented phenomenon in the U.S. See, for
instance, Blank and Card (1991), Blank and Ruggles (1996), and Currie and Gruber
(1996). Also in other contexts, it is argued that individuals make dominated choices
(see for example Choi et al., 2011, and the references therein).
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An important additional effect is that once individuals visit a doc-
tor, he may make them aware of additional health care needs. This is
a form of what has been termed supplier-induced demand (McGuire,
2000). Strauss and Thomas (1998) argue that this is an important
potential determinant of health care expenditures in developing
countries. The additional care consumption may or may not be pro-
vided to them for free, even though there are effectively no formal
coverage limits. As we explain in Section 2.3 above, the reason for
this is that some facilities suffered from severe supply limitations.
This could lead to patients paying for some treatments or buying
drugs elsewhere, for instance at a pharmacy. If this is the effect of
insurance coverage, then, as long as one thinks of doctors as not
providing misinformation to patients, one can make the argument
that spending money reveals the preference of the individual for
these increased expenditures and that the supplier-induced demand
is therefore beneficial to the individual.
To summarize the empirical predictions, we expect utilization to
increase once individuals are covered by health insurance, and out-
of-pocket health care expenditures to either increase (when indi-
viduals are made aware of many useful expenditures) or decrease
(when the majority of the treatments are provided by the health
care facilities and the overall out-of-pocket expenditures decrease
because less money is spent at the pharmacy and in health care
centers together).
4. Data
This paper uses cross-sectional data from the ENAHO household
survey for the year 2011, which is representative at the level of each
of the 24 departments in Peru. It is the only data set that provides
the information needed to re-compute the IFH index and, at the
same time, on health care utilization, its financing and out-of-pocket
expenditures.29 Online Appendix D contains details on the way we
define our outcome variables.
Data are collected using face-to-face interviews with one or more
respondents per household, who are also asked to provide informa-
tion on the other household members. Online Appendix C describes
the interview procedure related to the health questions. In brief, the
part of the survey related to health has two branches. In the first
branch, individuals are first asked whether they experienced health
problems and then what they did in response. In the second branch,
individuals are asked which health care services they used and then
who paid for it. This means that individuals may be asked twice
whether they visited a doctor, for instance. Importantly, the set of
outcomes in the first branch is finer than in the second branch, which
is why information on the financing source is not available for all
variables we use in our analysis.
Our data also contain information on the level of out-of-pocket
expenditures by financing source.
We construct three mutually exclusive categories for the financ-
ing source: 1) fully insured, if the individual indicates only a govern-
mental program or other insurance program as the financial source;
2) out-of-pocket, if the individual points only at a member of her
household or a member of other household as the financial source;
3) partially insured, if the individual reports the financial source by
combining alternatives of the first and second categories.
SIS is targeted to individuals who work in the informal sector.
For these individuals, the IFH index is the most important criterion
29 There are also data for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. For political reasons, how-
ever, the eligibility criteria were not applied strictly anymore in those later years.
Therefore, unlike in 2011, we cannot exploit a regression discontinuity design for
those later years.
to determine eligibility. Therefore, for our analysis, we select indi-
viduals that belong to a household in which no member is formally
employed.30 This group comprises approximately 60% of the entire
sample.
In 2011, almost one third of the population lived in the Lima
Province and half of Peru’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was gen-
erated there. For two reasons, we focus on individuals from that
province. First, in 2011 the IFH targeting rule was only applied in this
area, before this was gradually extended to the rest of the country
(Ministerio de Salud, 2011). In other parts of the country and in later
years it was less strictly applied. Second, the Lima Province is very
densely populated and therefore there are enough health care cen-
ters and medical professionals so that we can exclude that either a
large distance or absence of the staff explain that individuals do not
demand health care.31 This means, however, that our results do not
necessarily apply to the rest of the country.
Our sample contains information on 4161 individuals after the
two exclusion criteria are applied. Tables A.4 through A.6 in Online
Appendix E provide summary statistics for the full sample. In our
main analysis below we use a more local sample to carry out regres-
sions and report our estimate of the baseline level for each outcome
along with our estimate of the effect of insurance coverage. As
described in Section 5 below, this baseline is the expected outcome
for individuals who are just not eligible for SIS. It is a more mean-
ingful statistic than the raw mean in our sample, because it is for
the same group of individuals for whom we estimate the effects by
means of exploiting the RDD.
5. Econometric approach
In this paper, we estimate the impact of SIS coverage on a
host of variables characterizing health care utilization and out-of-
pocket expenditures. Based on the institutional setup described in
Section 2.2 we do this by means of a RDD using the IFH index as the
continuous forcing variable.32
An individual is eligible for public insurance if she lives under
poor conditions, which is measured at the household level. In the
Lima Province, the condition for this is that the IFH index is below
or equal to a value of 55, provided that both, water and electric-
ity expenditures do not exceed 20 and 25 Soles, respectively. Hence,
provided that the condition on water and electricity expenditures
holds, we have a sharp RDD.
30 We define formality as having monetary income from dependent employment.
This does not include any other monetary income or income from self-employment.
This definition is close to the one used by the authorities: they distinguish between
individuals whose wage is observable by them (available in governmental databases)
and others. We have also explored other definitions, including having a formal con-
tract in the main occupation, working in an enterprise that keeps accounting books
and being affiliated to a pension system. Results remain qualitatively the same.
31 According to Banerjee et al. (2004) these are two prime reasons why households
in Rajasthan in India spend a considerable fraction of their budget on health care,
essentially buying drugs. In other parts of Peru, utilization of health services has been
limited by supply constraints. The Office of the Ombudsman reports that most of the
4500 health care centers around the country are not sufficiently equipped to provide
inpatient care (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2013). An official technical committee con-
cludes that the biggest challenge faced by the Peruvian health system between 2009
and 2011 is the shortage of supply of health services in many parts of the country,
because it lacks adequate capacity infrastructure, equipment and human resources
(Comité Técnico Implementador del AUS, 2010). Finally, also statistics from the World
Bank shows that, while the average of hospital beds per 1000 people is 1.83 for Latin
America, it is only 1.55 for Peru. This also occurs with other measures of supply
health services, including the number of health workers such as physicians, nurses
and midwives (World Bank, 2013).
32 This approach goes back to at least Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). See Hahn
et al. (2001) for a more modern exposition and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a
discussion of practical issues.
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We will impose linearity around the eligibility threshold and esti-
mate the effects using the standard ordinary least squares estimator
with estimation equations of the form
yi =b0 + b1zi + b2elig IFHi + b3zi • elig IFHi
+ b4not elig WEi + b5not elig WEi • elig IFHi
+ b6not elig WEi • zi + x′ib7 + ei.
Here, zi is the IFH index centered at its threshold, elig_IFHi is an
indicator for eligibility based on the IFH index (that is, an indicator
for zi ≤ 0), and not_elig_WEi is an indicator for ineligibility based
on water and electricity consumption. xi is a vector of controls that
are de-meaned. The parameter of interest is b2, which is the effect
of health insurance coverage for individuals who become covered
because their IFH index crosses from above to just below the eli-
gibility threshold. This parameter is policy-relevant because it is
directly related to the question what the effects of expanding insur-
ance coverage through increasing the threshold value would be for
the individuals who would then receive coverage.33 We also report
estimates of b0. Recall that xi is de-meaned. This means that what we
report is the baseline level of the outcome, when zi is just above the
threshold for eligibility.
The first assumption we need to make for our analysis is that if
no insurance or insurance would be assigned to everybody around
the threshold, then the respective distribution of the outcome con-
ditional on the index would be smooth in the index zi around zero.34
Then, b2 is indeed the effect of coverage. This assumption cannot be
tested directly and is therefore the main assumption we will make.
As we have argued before, the institutional rules suggest that it holds,
as no other programs or rules are based on this eligibility threshold.
Moreover, this assumption is supported by further evidence that we
present in Section 7 below.35
The second assumption is that insurance status is monotone in
eligibility. This holds by construction, as we are facing a sharp regres-
sion discontinuity design and therefore, changing from a value of
the index slightly higher than the threshold to a value lower than
the threshold will directly make an individual eligible for insurance
coverage.36 The final, third assumption is an exclusion restriction. It
is that in a small neighborhood around the eligibility threshold, the
value of the index, zi, is independent of the outcomes, and in partic-
ular ei.37 It would be violated if households would manipulate their
answers to the government official in order to influence the value of
the IFH index. As discussed in Section 2 this is unlikely to be the case.
We nevertheless test for manipulation in Section 7.1.
Under the same assumptions, it is also possible to exploit the RDD
and estimate quantile treatment effects, as described in Frandsen et
al. (2012). The underlying idea is straightforward. Instead of an aver-
age, the quantile treatment effect is the change in, say, the median
33 For individuals ineligible due to their high consumption of water and electricity,
the effect of the IFH index crossing from above to just below the eligibility threshold
is the sum of b2 and b5. Our results show that this sum is generally not significantly
different from zero.
34 See Frandsen et al. (2012) for a precise statement. This is slightly stronger than
needed. Usually, it is enough to assume that the two conditional expectations are
smooth around the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). We make this stronger
assumption here in order to be able to estimate quantile treatment effects as well, as
described below.
35 For instance, we show in Fig. A.8 and Table A.14 below that water and electricity
consumption do not exhibit a discontinuity at the eligibility threshold. This means that
there is independent variation in the IFH index.
36 In that sense, monotonicity automatically holds. It does not automatically hold
when some individuals are unaware of being covered. This becomes relevant in
Section 7.7. See also Battistin et al. (2009) and Klein (2010) for related discussions.
37 Again, for the same reason as above, mean independence suffices for most of our
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Fig. 1. Receives curative care. Notes: Based on ENAHO data for the year 2011 for the
Lima Province. See Section 4 and Online Appendix E and F for details on the data and on
how the IFH index is computed. The dots denote averages, with a bin width of 3. Their
size represents the number of observations. The regression lines with corresponding
95% confidence intervals stem from separate linear regressions to the left and to the
right of the threshold using the individual-level data.
of the distribution of an outcome that results from being covered by
public health insurance. Results are presented in Section 6.2.
Before presenting the results, it is worth noting that our econo-
metric approach does not involve a “first stage”, as it is usually the
case in similar studies exploiting a regression discontinuity design. It
is easiest to see this by inspecting the estimation equation above. If
individuals are anyway not eligible and hence not covered by health
insurance because of their water or electricity consumption, then
we will control for this.38 Consequently, b2 is the effect of becom-
ing eligible due to crossing the IFH eligibility threshold for all other
individuals. As we have explained above, given the institutional rules
eligibility essentially implies coverage. Hence, this is not only the
effect of eligibility, but also the effect of coverage. This is as if the
first stage is one, which is always the case in a sharp regression dis-
continuity design (Hahn et al., 2001). Alternatively, as we discuss in
Section 7.7 below, our estimates can be interpreted as intent-to-treat
effects, or lower bounds of effect sizes.
6. Results
6.1. Health care utilization
We start by showing the relationship between the probability to
receive curative care and the IFH index in Fig. 1.39 Recall that higher
values of the index indicate a higher level of welfare. Individuals are
covered by SIS when the index is below the eligibility threshold. In
the figure, we plot estimates of the probability to receive curative
care against the IFH index minus the eligibility threshold, which is
why we expect the downward jump of utilization at zero that we also
observe in the figure. The interpretation is that insurance coverage
has a positive effect on the probability to consume curative care.
38 We did not drop these observations in order to be able to estimate b7 and con-
sequently the effects of interest more precisely. Dropping them instead led to very
similar point estimates. Moreover, the estimated effect of crossing the eligibility
threshold should be zero for individuals who live in households with high enough
water or electricity consumption. This is testable and generally, we found that b2 +b5
was not significantly different from zero.
39 See Figs. A.2 to A.7 in Online Appendix H for additional outcomes. Notice that we
use a linear specification for the fit. We have tested whether coefficients on higher
order term were significantly different from zero and they were generally not.
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Table 1
Effect of health insurance on health care utilization.
General Effect by financing source
Effect Baseline Fully insured 7/. Partially insured 8/. Out of pocket 9/.
More general forms of care usually provided by health care center
Doctor visits 0.0887* 0.2961∗∗∗ 0.0591∗∗ 0.0097 0.0191
(0.0501) (0.0330) (0.0248) (0.0098) (0.0475)
Medicines 0.1455∗∗∗ 0.4195∗∗∗ 0.0293 0.0129 0.1039∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0351) (0.0227) (0.0126) (0.0523)
Analysis 0.0548∗∗ 0.0187 0.0332∗∗ −0.0025 0.0241
(0.0256) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0022) (0.0202)
X-rays 0.0340* 0.0203* 0.0068 0.0087 0.0178
(0.0200) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0054) (0.0158)
Other tests −0.0051 0.0197∗∗ −0.0136 0.0085
(0.0145) (0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0099)
Glasses 1/. 0.0223 0.0142 0.0053 0.0170
(0.0187) (0.0125) (0.0037) (0.0184)
Other treatments −0.0210 0.2134∗∗∗ 0.0044 −0.0081 −0.0115
(0.0431) (0.0302) (0.0179) (0.0086) (0.0398)
Care provided by hospital
Hospital and/or surgery 0.0776∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗ 0.0044 −0.0002 0.0636∗∗∗





Child birth 2/. 0.0581 0.0521∗∗ 0.0558 0.0017 0.0006
(0.0482) (0.0249) (0.0477) (0.0082) (0.0016)
Dental care 0.0362 0.0868∗∗∗ 0.0170 0.0013 0.0180
(0.0320) (0.0203) (0.0172) (0.0013) (0.0278)
Ophthalmological care 0.0187 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0142 0.0003 0.0038
(0.0238) (0.0167) (0.0087) (0.0004) (0.0225)
Likely preventive care
Vaccines 0.0685* 0.1050∗∗∗ 0.0653* 0.0000 0.0119*
(0.0352) (0.0218) (0.0343) (0.0001) (0.0070)
Birth control −0.0164 0.0805∗∗∗ 0.0141 0.0034 −0.0338*
(0.0260) (0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0034) (0.0200)
Pregnancy care 2/. 0.0909 0.1215∗∗∗ 0.0860* 0.0183 −0.0133
(0.0641) (0.0373) (0.0467) (0.0261) (0.0415)
Kids check 3/. 0.0193 0.2410∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.0154 0.0022
(0.1022) (0.0672) (0.1008) (0.0133) (0.0907)
Planning 2/. 0.1135* 0.0704∗∗
(0.0593) (0.0339)
Iron 4/. 0.0046 0.1609*
(0.1221) (0.0909)
Preventive campaign −0.0456∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0157)
Care use
Seek medical attention 5/. 0.0784* 0.1643∗∗∗
(0.0427) (0.0277)
Receives curative care 6/. 0.1231∗∗∗ 0.1940∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0301)
Notes: We selected individuals with an IFH index that is at most 20 points away from the eligibility threshold. N = 2799 (N = 792 for childbirth and pregnancy care; N = 436 for
kids check; N = 791 for planning; 229 for iron). See Table A.2 for variable definitions. 1/. Not covered by SIS. 2/. Questions applied for women in fertile age. 3/. Question applied
for kids under 10. 4/. Question applied for pregnant women and kids under 3. 5/. Experience any symptom, illness, relapse or accident and seek medical attention. 6/. Receives
curative care if any of the following eight variables is one: doctor visit interacted with seek medical attention, medicines interacted with seek medical attention, analysis interacted
with seek medical attention, X-rays interacted with seek medical attention, other tests interacted with seek medical attention, hospital, surgery or childbirth. 7/. Health care fully
funded by government programs like SIS. 8/. Health care funded by government and household. 9/. Health care fully funded by household (either the own household or another
one). Estimates by financing source are not available for some outcomes due to lack of information on the financing source or to lack of variability in the dependent variable (see




Next, Table 1 shows estimates of the effect of SIS on the utilization
of a number of health services, including the one in Fig. 1.40 These
are local in the sense that we select individuals with an IFH index
that is at most 20 points away from the eligibility threshold and, as
described in Section 5 above, we control for the value of the index
40 Sensitivity analyses are carried out in Section 7 below.
separately to the left and to the right of the eligibility threshold. We
also control for age, gender, whether the head of the household is
female, the number of household members, and years of education.
We also report respective baselines in the second column, which are
estimates of the mean outcome conditional on the IFH index being
just above the threshold so that individuals are just not covered by
health insurance. The last three columns use interactions between
the financing source and the outcome variable. Here, we make use of
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the fact that individuals report on both jointly. For instance, individ-
uals are asked whether they visited a doctor and then, if they say yes,
whether the service they received was fully covered by insurance,
whether they paid part of it out-of-pocket, or whether they paid
everything out-of-pocket. This allows us to for instance construct
the joint outcome “went to the doctor and services received were
fully insured”. Table A.7 in Online Appendix E shows the respective
numbers of instances in our data.
We start by looking at more general forms of care, typically pro-
vided by easily accessible health care centers. The first row shows
that health insurance coverage has a positive effect on the probability
of visiting a doctor in the four weeks prior to the interview. It
increases by 9 percentage points from a baseline of 30%(significant
at the 10% level). This is driven by fully insured doctor visits (6 per-
centage points at the 5% level of significance), while the effect on
doctor visits that individuals have to at least partially pay for is not
significantly different from zero.
The second row shows that coverage also increases the probabil-
ity to receive medicines in the four weeks prior to the interview by
15 percentage points, from a baseline of 42%. In contrast to the effect
on doctor visits, most of the effect—10 percentage points—is related
to medicines that individuals pay for out-of-pocket. The third row
shows that coverage increases the probability that medical analysis
is performed in the last four weeks, by 5 percentage points from a
baseline that is not significantly different from zero. More than half of
this effect—3 percentage points—is explained by fully covered access.
As for doctor visits, the effect on the probability of receiving medical
analysis and at least partly paying for it is not significantly different
from zero.
As described in Section 2.3, MINSA health care centers pro-
vide only basic services. As for care provided by hospitals, health
insurance coverage leads to an 8 percentage points increase in the
probability to be hospitalized or to receive surgery, from a baseline
of about 4%. The survey does not contain information on the financ-
ing source for both separately, but for both together. The last column
suggests that households paid at least for part of this themselves.
So far, these results suggest that coverage lead to increased access
to doctors who perform medical analysis and prescribe drugs. While
the increases in doctor visits and medical analysis are usually fully
financed by SIS, drugs, hospitalization and/or surgery are at least
partly financed by households themselves—even though these can
actually be considered covered by insurance (see Section 2.2). The
discrepancy can be explained by the supply limitations we describe
in Section 2.3.
The results presented here shed some more light on the under-
lying mechanism. They suggest that individuals are not getting all
the drugs they need at the MINSA facilities and therefore, they go
elsewhere to buy them, for instance at private pharmacies.41
Table 1 also shows that health insurance coverage has no signifi-
cant effects on utilization of dental and ophthalmological care during
the previous three months. This can be explained by yet another
supply limitation described in Section 2.3, namely the shortage of
dentists and ophthalmologists.
41 Facilities are not supposed to charge money to individuals covered by SIS. We
could test whether this is true for medicines. When individuals say that they received
medicines, then the questionnaire also asks them whether a household member paid
for them and if so, where they bought them, at a MINSA facility or at a private phar-
macy. Using this, we construct two outcome variables: bought medicines at a MINSA
facility and bought medicines at a private pharmacy. If they did not buy any medicines
then both of them are coded as zero. Using the same specification as in Table 1, the
effect is not significantly different from zero for buying medicines at a MINSA facility
(−0.0037 with a standard error of 0.018), but positive and significantly different from
zero for buying them at a private pharmacy (0.108 with a standard error of 0.051). This
can be seen as a decomposition of the reported effect of 0.1039 in the last column of
Table 1.
Turning to care that is more likely of a preventive nature, we
generally find no significant effects. As we explain in Section 2, the
system does not provide extra incentives for that. In fact, the only sig-
nificant effect we find is on the probability to see a doctor to receive
information on the prevention of a sickness (preventive campaign),
and this effect is actually negative. This could be an indication of
moral hazard, in the sense that patients invest less in their health in
case they are covered by health insurance. It is interesting to contrast
these results to the ones by Miller et al. (2013) for Colombia, where
the system provides larger incentives to invest in preventive care, as
already discussed in Section 1. And indeed, Miller et al. (2013) find
stronger positive effects on preventive care.
Overall, the picture that emerges is that the effects of health
insurance coverage are positive for forms of care that are of a more
general nature and can be provided by MINSA health care centers
at relatively low cost, such as doctor visits and medical analysis. We
provide evidence that these services are indeed free to the patient.
We also find positive effects on receiving medicines, hospitalization
and surgery, but here it turns out that individuals pay for these ser-
vices themselves. This suggests that insurance coverage may have
positive effects on out-of-pocket expenditures. In Section 6.2 below
we follow up on this by estimating the effects on out-of-pocket
spending by type of care.
Peru is a country in which poor individuals are accustomed to
not receiving any professional diagnosis and where drugs can also
be bought in a pharmacy without a prescription. Therefore, taken
together, our findings point towards the expansion of the program
being a success in the sense that it had a positive effect on health care
utilization, even if this is at least partly paid for by the individuals
themselves.
6.2. Expenditures
We argue in Section 3 that individual out-of-pocket spending
could be positively affected by health insurance coverage if receiv-
ing medical attention motivates individuals to actually spend more
on their health themselves, because they become aware of addi-
tional health care needs. This positive effect could originate in, or
be reinforced by the supply side limitations described in Section 2.3.
We have shown above that health insurance coverage has positive
effects on the likelihood that individuals receive medicines that they
pay for out-of-pocket, and also on the probability that they visit a
hospital and/or surgery is performed and that patients pay for out-
of-pocket. Obviously, health insurance coverage could also reduce
out-of-pocket spending because individuals do not have to pay for
certain treatments anymore, or pay less. So, whether the overall
effect is positive or negative is an empirical question.
In this section, we characterize the effect of health insurance cov-
erage on the full distribution of out-of-pocket spending and also
perform an analysis by spending category. Starting with mean spend-
ing, Fig. 2 suggests that total out-of-pocket expenditures actually
increased with insurance coverage.
In Table 2, we use a variety of outcome measures related
to moments of the distribution of health expenditures that have
also been used in other studies.42 They either attempt to mea-
sure expected health expenditures, their cross-sectional variability—
interpreted as health risk—, or the likelihood to incur catastrophic
health expenditures.43
42 See Table A.3 in the Online Appendix for detailed variable definitions. We also
experimented with more sophisticated variability measures and found similar results.
43 Most studies measure the cross-sectional variability of health expenditures and
then interpret it as health risk at the individual level. This is only valid if there is no
persistence in health expenditures. Otherwise, health risk is overestimated. See for
instance French and Jones (2004) for evidence in favor of such persistence in the U.S.
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Fig. 2. Total health care expenditure. Notes: Annual expenditure in Soles. See also
notes to Fig. 1.
Table 2 presents the results. The first dependent variable is an
indicator for incurring at least some health expenditures. We find no
significant effect on this outcome, suggesting that health expendi-
tures are, if at all, mainly affected at the intensive margin.
Turning to the intensive margin, the second outcome is the level
of annual health care expenditures. We find that insurance coverage
leads to an increase of annual spending by about 282 Soles on aver-
age, which corresponds to 102 U.S. dollars, —in line with the idea
that individuals are motivated to spend more on their health when
using medical services more often (which they do according to Table
1 in the Online Appendix). This is about 1.5% of the average house-
hold income among the insured (18,800 Soles according to Table A.4).
The effect is not significantly different from zero when we use log
expenditures.
With our next outcome measure, we examine a possible effect on
the variability of medical spending in the cross section. It is the mean
absolute deviation of health expenditures, calculated separately by
insurance status, and similar to the one used by Miller et al. (2013).
Health insurance has no significant effect on it.
The fifth and sixth measures are constructed from residuals
obtained from a regression of health expenditures on the value of the
index, insurance status and the interaction of these two variables.
Our aim is to measure the variation of health care expenditures in a
different way, and therefore we use the absolute value and square of
the residual instead of the more commonly used absolute value of the
expenditures and their square, respectively. Effects are significant at
the 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Looking at the results for the next two outcome measures, we
find significant effects on the probability that health expenditures
exceed the median or the 75th percentile of the distribution of health
expenditures in the entire population.
In order to control for possible income differences we also analyze
the effect of insurance on the share of annual health expenditures
spent out-of-pocket at the individual level, relative to the annual per
capita household income. We find significant effects on the expendi-
ture shares and also on the absolute deviation of the share and the
absolute value of the residual of the share. For the last two outcomes
in the second panel, we calculate the 50th and 75th percentile of the
distribution of the share and find that health insurance increases the
probability that this share exceeds the 50th and 75th percentile by
respectively 14 and 13 percentage points.
Finally, we look into whether SIS changes the probability of an
individual incurring catastrophic health expenditures. Health expen-
ditures are defined to be catastrophic if the share of the expenditures
relative to per capita household income exceeds pre-defined thresh-
old values. We follow Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) and use the
thresholds 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25% for this. We find that the probabil-
ity that individual health expenditures exceed 5% of the per capita
household income increases by 12 percentage points, from a baseline
of 20%. We also find highly significant effects for higher cutoffs.
Table 2
Effect of health insurance on the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditure.
Estimates Ste. Baseline Ste.
Any health expenditures 0.0527 (0.0522) 0.5773∗∗∗ (0.0357)
Health care expenditures
Health expenditures 282.2370∗∗ (116.0619) 216.5952∗∗∗ (67.7158)
Logarithm of health expenditures 0.4810 (0.3043) 2.9580∗∗∗ (0.2065)
Absolute deviation health expenditures 35.1882 (103.2521) 516.0123∗∗∗ (55.8416)
Absolute value residual expenditures 249.8391∗∗ (101.7011) 385.6647∗∗∗ (57.6521)
Squared residual expenditures 2.016e+06* (1.062e+06) −4707.6350 (5.546e+05)
Expenditures exceed median 0.1462∗∗∗ (0.0527) 0.4236∗∗∗ (0.0357)
Expenditures exceed 75th percentile 0.1780∗∗∗ (0.0428) 0.1070∗∗∗ (0.0261)
Health expenditures as a share of income
Share expenditures 0.0529∗∗ (0.0238) 0.0421∗∗∗ (0.0108)
Absolute deviation share 0.0379* (0.0219) 0.0707∗∗∗ (0.0093)
Absolute value residual share 0.0440∗∗ (0.0218) 0.0697∗∗∗ (0.0093)
Squared residual expenditures 0.0904 (0.0784) 0.0110 (0.0170)
Share exceeds median 0.1419∗∗∗ (0.0528) 0.4358∗∗∗ (0.0355)
Share exceeds 75th percentile 0.1328∗∗∗ (0.0449) 0.1905∗∗∗ (0.0287)
Catastrophic health expenditures
Exceeds 5% of per capita household income 0.1241∗∗∗ (0.0456) 0.2011∗∗∗ (0.0295)
Exceeds 10% of per capita household income 0.0768∗∗ (0.0380) 0.1150∗∗∗ (0.0244)
Exceeds 15% of per capita household income 0.0869∗∗∗ (0.0316) 0.0525∗∗∗ (0.0193)
Exceeds 20% of per capita household income 0.0891∗∗∗ (0.0271) 0.0215 (0.0158)
Exceeds 25% of per capita household income 0.0740∗∗∗ (0.0250) 0.0189 (0.0140)
Notes: We selected individuals with an IFH index that is at most 20 points away from the eligibility threshold. N = 2799. See Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Online Appendix for variable

































Fig. 3. Effect of health insurance on the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditure.
Notes: Out-of-pocket expenditure in annual Soles. We selected individuals with an
IFH index that is at most 20 points away from the eligibility threshold and excluded
those with high consumption of electricity and water. N = 1380. The figure shows
the percentiles of the distribution of expenditures with and without health insurance,
along with 95% confidence intervals. See Frandsen et al. (2012) for details on the
implementation.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section and the previ-
ous one suggests that health insurance coverage has positive effects
on the level and the variability of out-of-pocket spending and that
this is partly driven by supply limitations that led to individuals
paying for medicines, hospital visits and/or receiving surgery. Fig. 3
complements this evidence with estimates of the quantiles of the
distribution of health expenditures with and without health insur-
ance coverage. As explained in Section 5, also these estimates are
obtained exploiting the discontinuity at the eligibility threshold.44
Interestingly, we find that insurance has only a positive effect on the
higher end of the distribution.
It is remarkable that we never find a significant negative effect on
either expected health expenditures or measures of variability or risk
of high expenditures. Miller et al. (2013), in contrast, find for Colom-
bia that insurance lowers both mean inpatient medical spending and
its variability. Likewise, Limwattananon et al. (2015) find that health
insurance coverage leads to a decrease in out-of-pocket spending in
Thailand. To see what drives this and whether some types of spend-
ing were negatively affected, Table 3 reports estimates using the log
of spending plus 1 in different categories as the dependent variable
so that the reported effects are (approximately) average percentage
changes in spending. Consistently with our results shown in Table 1,
we find that spending on medicines increased by approximately 55%
on average and that spending on care provided by the hospital and/or
receiving a surgery increased by approximately 41%.45 In light of our
discussion in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 6.1 these results suggest that the
out-of-pocket expenditures are driven by the fact that individuals did
not receive all medicines at the facilities and went elsewhere to buy
them, and had to pay for some services at the hospitals even though
they were covered by insurance. This seems to be mainly explained
by supply limitations, in particular the short provision of medicines
and budget constraints faced for some hospitals.
44 Recall that we have a sharp regression discontinuity design, which means that
coverage changes from 0 to 100% at the eligibility threshold.
45 We have also conducted the analysis underlying Fig. 3 separately for each type
of health expenditures. Fig. A.9 in the Online Appendix shows the results for the two
types of health expenditures for which we have found an effect here. We can see that
the effects are driven by increases in the upper spending quantiles.
Table 3
Effect of health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditure by type of care.
Estimates Ste. Baseline Ste.
More general forms of care usually provided by health care center
Doctor visits 0.1178 (0.2189) 1.2312∗∗∗ (0.1481)
Medicines 0.5520∗∗ (0.2772) 1.9117∗∗∗ (0.1879)
Analysis 0.1444 (0.1218) 0.0659 (0.0775)
X-rays 0.1707* (0.0999) 0.0691 (0.0591)
Other tests 0.0547 (0.0623) 0.0291 (0.0333)
Glasses 1/. 0.1206 (0.1049) 0.0676 (0.0700)
Other treatments −0.1108 (0.1745) 0.7175∗∗∗ (0.1252)
Care provided by hospital
Hospital and/or surgery 0.4100∗∗∗ (0.1247) 0.0022 (0.0715)
Child birth 2/. −0.0040 (0.0242) 0.0256 (0.0303)
Dental care 0.1570 (0.1495) 0.3395∗∗∗ (0.0947)
Ophthalmological care 0.0417 (0.1020) 0.2028∗∗∗ (0.0702)
Likely preventive care
Vaccines 0.0509 (0.0312) 0.0006 (0.0049)
Birth control −0.1398 (0.0921) 0.2241∗∗∗ (0.0695)
Pregnancy care 2/. 0.0388 (0.1535) 0.2496∗∗ (0.1025)
Kids check 3/. 0.1134 (0.3375) 0.2323 (0.2370)
Notes: We selected individuals with an IFH index that is at most 20 points away from
the eligibility threshold. N = 2799 (N = 792 for childbirth and pregnancy care; N =
436 for kids check). All dependent variables are out-of-pocket spending in logs by
health care service (see Table A.2 for definitions). 1/. Not covered by SIS. 2/. Ques-
tions applied for women in fertile age. 3/. Question applied for kids under 10. Robust




Rises in health care expenditures as we find them are usually
seen in a critical way, especially if some treatments are formally cov-
ered but individuals have to nevertheless pay for them. However,
one may question whether this is justified here. On the one hand,
this increase in expenditures can be seen as an additional burden to
the individuals, possibly also increasing the variability of expendi-
tures in the cross-section. On the other hand, the alternative could
also be that individuals are not treated at all because they are not
aware of their health care needs. In that sense the increase in spend-
ing for medicines as well as hospital care and/or surgery could also
be seen as a desirable consequence of insurance coverage, which
leads to increased accessibility, and thereby gives individuals the
idea of using medical services in response to being insured.46 More-
over, looking at it in yet another way, some treatments are at least
partly covered by SIS, or a complement to it such as a doctor visit or
a medical analysis is, so that the overall price of being treated is gen-
erally lower, which means that the law of demand (that lower prices
mean more demand) would also predict an increase in usage. So also
in that sense our findings could be less worrying than they may first
seem.
7. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, after having presented the main results, we assess
whether they are sensitive to the particular specifications we have
used, and whether the identifying assumptions we have made can
be supported by additional empirical evidence. We start by exam-
ining whether households may have manipulated the IFH index in
order to become eligible for public insurance. Thereafter, second, we
perform the analysis for a bigger sample. Throughout the analysis,
we have controlled for covariates. Therefore, third, we also con-
duct the analysis without controlling for covariates and we assess
whether there were jumps in the expectations of covariates at the
eligibility threshold. In passing, we confirm that also the expectation
46 It would be undesirable if doctors would give patients misinformation.
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of water and electricity consumption, respectively, do not exhibit
such a jump. Fourth, we assess whether there were discontinuities
at other values of the welfare index. This would raise concerns, as
our approach builds on the premise that there is only one disconti-
nuity of the expected outcomes in the welfare index, at least locally.
After that, fifth, we conduct a non-parametric analysis. Sixth, we
assess whether the existence of other programs could challenge the
validity of our results. And finally, seventh, we discuss when our
results could be considered lower bounds of the effects of inter-
est. All corresponding tables and figures can be found in Online
Appendix I.
7.1. Manipulation of the running variable
A common threat to studies based on a RDD is the incentive to
manipulate the running variable. For this, individuals need infor-
mation on how the IFH is calculated. Then, they need to use this
knowledge to manipulate their answers to the questions posed by
the government official in order to qualify for SIS. This is unlikely to
be the case for two reasons. First, even though the information on
how the index is computed is, technically speaking, public, it is not
easy to obtain and process it. Second, the set of variables included
in the IFH construction are verified by the government officials and
therefore difficult to manipulate.
We nevertheless analyze this potential thread using the McCrary
(2008) test. The idea is that if manipulation takes place, then the den-
sity of the running variable will be discontinuous at the cutoff. In our
context, the density function would show many households barely
qualifying for SIS, that is, to the left of the cutoff, and fewer failing
to qualify, that is, to the right of the cutoff. The formal procedure is
twofold: first, a finely gridded histogram is obtained and then this
histogram is smoothed with a local linear regression on each side of
the cutoff.47
Fig. A.10 presents the results. There is no evidence for a jump of
the density at the eligibility threshold, supporting the assumptions
made in the main analysis.
7.2. Analysis for the full sample
Our main results have been obtained under the assumption that
expected outcomes are approximately linear in the welfare index,
separately to the left and the right of the eligibility threshold. In
order to alleviate the concern that this assumption is strong, we have
performed the analysis locally, selecting a sample of individuals for
whom the index is at most 20 points away from the threshold. In
general, there is a tradeoff between precision and bias, and using a
bigger sample has the advantage that the precision of our estimates
may increase. Therefore it is interesting to also perform the analy-
sis for the full sample and to compare the results to the main ones
reported above.
The first column of, respectively, Tables A.12 and A.13, shows the
results. Comparing Table A.12 to Table 1 we see that the magnitudes
of the estimated effects are slightly lower when we use the full sam-
ple while the precision increases. But qualitatively, the results are
very similar. Comparing Table A.13 to Tables 2 and 3 we find a similar
pattern, with the exception of the results on health expenditures as
a share of income and catastrophic health expenditures. For the full
sample, the magnitude of the estimated effects decreases by more
than the standard errors and hence some of them are not found to be
significantly different from zero.
Overall, the picture remains qualitatively and also quantitatively
the same: the effects on utilization are strongest, in particular for
47 The IFH index is measured at the household level. Therefore, we conduct the
analysis here also at the household level.
curative use, health expenditures increase in terms of levels and vari-
ability, driven by increases in out-of-pocket spending for medicines.
7.3. Testing for discontinuities in household characteristics
For our approach to be valid it is necessary that the covered and
non-covered individuals who have a value of the IFH index close to
the eligibility threshold are similar to one another (Section 5). It is
standard practice to test whether the expectation of covariates such
as age or gender is a continuous function in the welfare index around
the eligibility threshold. When it is found not to be, then one may be
concerned that the assumptions underlying our analysis do not hold
and one may want to conduct the analysis without controlling for
covariates.
We first conduct both a graphical and a formal analysis in which
we replace the dependent health variables by the observed covari-
ates gender, age, years of education, the number of household mem-
bers, and whether the woman is the head of the household. These
are the variables that we use as controls in order to be able to
obtain more precise estimates. We also tested for discontinuities in
household income, total household expenditure, and also water and
electricity consumption. We would be concerned if water and elec-
tricity consumption would exhibit a discontinuity because eligibility
is only based on the index if both of them are not big enough.
Fig. A.8 and Table A.14 summarize the results. The latter reports
estimates of the effect of insurance on these variables, conducted
either at the household or at the individual level, depending on the
variable. We do not find evidence for discontinuities.
We also conducted the main analysis without controlling for
covariates. Tables A.12 and A.13 show that results are actually very
similar and that the main conclusions we have drawn remain the
same.
7.4. Jumps at non-discontinuity points
Our analysis implicitly assumes that the only discontinuities
occur at the eligibility threshold, 55, as we have specified conditional
expectations to be linear in the forcing variable, separately to the left
and to the right of this threshold. A first way of assessing this is to
conduct a graphical inspection. Figs. A.2 through A.7 suggest that the
discontinuities do indeed mainly arise at the eligibility threshold.
Besides, following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) we conduct sep-
arate additional RDD analysis for the samples of covered and non-
covered individuals and use the midpoints of the index in the
respective samples as the threshold values. That is, we test for a dis-
continuity at values of the index other than the actual threshold.
Recall that in our main analysis we use only individuals whose index
is at most 20 points away from the eligibility threshold. Here, we now
use a sample of individuals with an index that is between 40 points
lower than the threshold and the threshold, and another sample of
individuals for whom the index lies between the eligibility threshold
and 40 points above that.
Results are presented in Tables A.15 and A.16. In general, we
observe no significant effects on health outcome variables when we
run the regressions using those hypothetical thresholds, with the
exception of a few cases.48 Figs. A.2 through A.7 suggest that what is
48 Actually, here—and in fact throughout the paper—we face a problem of multiple
testing. For the results presented in Tables A.15 and A.16, if the null hypothesis were
true, then we would expect 1 of them to be significantly different from zero at the 1%
level (2 are), 5–6 at the 5% level (2 are at the 1% level plus 5 at the 5% level), and 11
at the 10% level (2 plus 5 plus 4, so 11 are). The number of significant results is thus
very close to what one would expect. There are ways to correct for this, but if test
statistics are likely to be highly dependent, which in our case they are (think of the
outcomes “hospital and/or surgery”, “hospital”, and “surgery”), these procedures may
be too conservative.
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picked up by this robustness check is that the linearity assumption
may be too strong for some outcomes. At the same time, we find
many more effects to be significantly different from zero when we
use the actual thresholds instead of the hypothetical ones. Next,
we at least partially address a related concern by carrying out a
nonparametric analysis.
7.5. Non-parametric analysis
To address the concern that linearity is too strong of an
assumption even in smaller subsamples we conduct a non-
parametric analysis. For this we follow Calonico et al. (2014). The
main difference in terms of implementation is that we drop individ-
uals for whom either water or electricity consumption is too high to
be eligible for health insurance.
Comparing the results reported in Tables A.17 through A.19 to the
ones in Tables 1 though 3 we again find that the strongest and most
robust effects are on receiving medicines and hospital care and/or
surgery, financed out-of-pocket, and positive effects on the level and
the variability of out-of-pocket health care expenditures.
7.6. Juntos and food aid program
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that dis-
continuities at the eligibility threshold can be attributed to SIS. There
are some programs whose presence could in principle challenge this
assumption.
One of them is Juntos, a conditional cash transfer program. It com-
bines a geographic targeting of the poorest districts with individual
targeting, based on the IFH index and the presence of children up
to the age of 14. However, Juntos is a rural program and our study
focuses on the Lima Province, and our data confirm that no individual
in the sample belongs to Juntos.
Besides, there is a number of food aid programs oriented to the
poor. To be precise, they are oriented to different groups of the pop-
ulation, such as mothers, children and school students. Our data
show that 29% of the individuals of our sample receive at least sup-
port from one of them.49 Importantly, since these programs do not
use SISFOH’s targeting rules and in particular not the IFH index, it
is unlikely that a discontinuity at the eligibility threshold can be
attributed to them. Our finding in Section 7.3 that household expen-
ditures do not exhibit a discontinuity at the insurance threshold
provides additional support for this interpretation.
7.7. Re-interpreting our results as intent-to-treat effects or lower
bounds of the effect sizes
In our analysis, we estimate the effect of becoming eligible for SIS
due to crossing the eligibility threshold. As we describe in Section 5,
we control for ineligibility that is due to other reasons and explain
why we therefore face a sharp regression discontinuity design and
estimate the average effect of becoming eligible. We argue in the
Introduction and in Section 2.2 that this effect is essentially the effect
of insurance coverage, because enrolling involves filling in a form and
if eligible, individuals can usually come back the next day to receive
treatment.
It could nevertheless be that individuals do not know whether
or not they are actually covered by health insurance. This by itself
would not be a problem if they would always try to enroll and then
learn that they are actually not eligible. If they wrongly believe that
they are not eligible and therefore do not even try to enroll, then
49 The percentage of individuals that receive food aid is 29% among those not covered
by SIS and 51% among those who are covered. There is no information on the reception
of food aid for 874 individuals, or 20% of our sample.
they may behave as if they are not covered by health insurance. Our
analysis, however, assumes that they are covered. Consequently, the
effects we estimate can be re-interpreted as intent-to-treat effects
or lower bounds of effect sizes for those who know that they are
covered. To see this, suppose that among those individuals with a
value of the index that is very close to the threshold, 40% of the eli-
gible individuals believe that they are not eligible and therefore the
effect of becoming eligible is zero for them. The effect we then esti-
mate is the intent-to-treat effect, which is a weighted average of the
zero effect for those 40% who wrongly believe that they are not cov-
ered and the actual effect for the remaining 60% of the individuals.
The intent-to-treat effect is always of the same sign but smaller in
magnitude than the actual effect for those who know that they are
eligible and in that sense we are estimating lower bounds of the
effect sizes.50,51
8. Conclusions
Until recently, large parts of the population in developing
countries did not have access to public health insurance. While it
is commonly believed that the effects of health insurance coverage
are positive, opportunities to control for selection by exploiting nat-
ural experiments or by conducting field experiments are rare, and
therefore we still lack empirical evidence on its impact on health
care utilization and out-of-pocket expenditures. Besides, it is not yet
fully understood through which channels health insurance coverage
ultimately leads to better health outcomes and to what extent it is
possible to encourage individuals to invest into preventive care.
In this paper, we use rich survey data from Peru to study the
effects of the large-scale social health insurance program called
“Seguro Integral de Salud” (SIS). The SIS program is targeted to
poor individuals working in the informal labor market. We make
use of the institutional details that give rise to a sharp regression
discontinuity design. We estimate the effect of insurance cover-
age on a wealth of measures for health care utilization and health
expenditures.
We find strong effects of insurance coverage on arguably desir-
able, from a social welfare point of view, treatments such as visiting
a hospital and receiving surgery and on forms of care that can
be provided at relatively low cost, such as medical analysis in the
first place and receiving medication. Effects on preventive care are
much less pronounced. This is not surprising, as the system does
not provide any extra incentives to actually use them. Furthermore,
we find positive effects of health insurance coverage on the level
and the variability of out-of-pocket spending that are mostly driven
by increased spending for medicines and for hospital care and/or
surgery, resulting from supply limitations.
Based on this evidence, we develop two arguments that are less
common in economics. First, access to health care centers leads to
increased awareness about health problems. Once covered, individ-
uals see a doctor and learn about the needs they were unaware of.
Second, this even generates a willingness to pay for services that are
50 Note that if the effect is negative, then these are upper bounds of the effects, but
lower bounds of the effect sizes. Note also that the effect the program would have
had on those who wrongly believe that they are not covered, had they been covered,
will never play a role here. Instead, the intent-to-treat effect contains a zero effect for
them.
51 One may think that we could use an instrumental variables estimator where we
treat SIS enrollment as the endogenous variable and eligibility as the instrument, to
estimate the actual effect insurance coverage has. This, however, will only estimate
the effect of coverage if all individuals who are covered also enroll. If, to the contrary,
there are some individuals who do only enroll if they need health insurance, we will
instead estimate the effect of health insurance for the subpopulation of those who
enroll when becoming eligible and have medical needs at that point. This effect is
likely higher than the overall effect of insurance coverage for individuals close to the
threshold.
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in short supply, which in the context of Peru is a potentially desir-
able form of supplier-induced demand. By spending out-of-pocket,
individuals reveal their preference for medical care.
Overall, the evidence suggests that when compared to health care
systems in other developing countries, the Peruvian one is a notable
exception. It seems to reach its goal to provide access to medical care
to a sizable fraction of the poor. A key determinant of this success
seems to be that the monetary cost of enrolling is zero, instead of
being small but positive, which it is elsewhere. As of now, there is
no evidence on the effects this will have on objectively measured
health, but it is imaginable that increased access will ultimately lead
to better health outcomes.
Supplementary information
The Online Appendix and a replication package can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.008.
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